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Abstract 
We examine the relationships between productivity growth, IT investment and organisational change 
(∆Ο) using UK firm data. Consistent with the small number of other micro studies we find (a) IT 
appears to have high returns in a growth accounting sense when ∆Ο is omitted; when ∆Ο is included 
the IT returns are greatly reduced, (b) IT and ∆Ο interact in their effect on productivity growth, (c) 
non-IT investment and ∆Ο do not interact in their effect on productivity growth. Some new findings 
are (a) ∆Ο is affected by competition; (b) US-owned firms are much more likely to introduce ∆Ο 
relative to foreign owned firms who are more likely still relative to UK firms; (c) our predicted 
measured TFP growth slowdown for firms who are not doing ∆O and/or are in the early stages of IT 
investment compare well with the macro numbers documenting a UK measured TFP growth 
slowdown. 
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1 Introduction 
With the extraordinary pervasiveness of information technology (IT) in modern economies, 
understanding the impact of IT on productivity growth is a matter of major importance for academics, 
business and policymakers.  Two particular questions have arisen in the literature.  First, how does IT 
interact with other factors of production to influence productivity?  Second, and perhaps related, why have 
many European countries, who have been building up a share of IT capital comparable to the US, had 
slowdowns in total factor productivity growth?  
One suggested answer to this puzzle is that (a) computer investment requires complementary 
investment in organisational capital, O (and thus organisational change ∆O) to obtain productivity gains and 
(b) such investment in O requires diverting resources away from current production. Thus (a) if firms or 
nations do not undertake such investment, they fail to get the productivity gains, and/or (b) whilst they are 
undertaking such investment their measured productivity growth might slow down (as they devote 
employment to this investment and away from current production).1   
There are (at least) two issues surrounding this literature.  First, as for the evidence base, the 
evidence from macro data is rather mixed (Basu et al, 2003), but without a ready macro measure of 
organisational change it is still rather a matter of conjecture.  There is relatively little micro evidence, mostly 
because it is very hard to find systematic micro data on all of output, IT, other inputs and organisational 
measures.2  Examples of such papers are Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002, BBH), papers by 
Ichniowski and Shaw and co-authors (summarised in Ichniowski and Shaw, 2003), and Black and Lynch 
(2003) but this literature is still small and mostly confined to the US.3  A second issue is that, as is well 
acknowledged, ∆O is likely endogenous.  Thus an account of the impact of ∆O would be more complete if 
there were an explanation of what drives ∆O in firms.4 
This paper uses UK firm-level panel data on productivity, IT and organisational change to try to 
shed light on both these issues.  Some of our findings we believe to be of interest since they are consistent 
with findings in data for the US.  But some of our findings we believe add to the extant literature. 
We have four findings that are consistent with other studies.  First, IT appears to have high returns 
in a growth accounting sense when one omits ∆O, which then fall when ∆O is included.  Second, IT and ∆O 
interact in their effect on productivity growth.  Third, there is no additional impact on productivity growth 
from the interaction of ∆O and non-IT investment.  Fourth, above-average periods of investment in IT are 
                                                   
1
 An alternative explanation is that the poor EU productivity growth results in large part from relatively poor 
productivity growth in wholesaling and retailing.  This might in turn be due in part to planning regulations, but since 
wholesaling and retailing uses IT intensively it could also be due to relatively “poor” use of the IT capital stock.  Note 
too that economies trying to catch up to US IT levels will be investing heavily in IT capital the adjustment costs of 
which might depress measured TFP growth.  
2
 As Black and Lynch (2001) point out, there are case studies of IT and organisational change. There are also many 
articles on IT and wage inequality which is not our central concern here, see e.g. Bresnahan (1999). 
3
 Caroli and van Reenen (2001) look at the effect of organisational change and its determinants, but their main focus is 
on skills (they have some evidence on organisational change and productivity in France, see below).  
4
 BBH emphasise their primary concern is not endogeneity of O, but to document the co-movement of O and IT; while  
Ichniowski and Shaw (2003) for example emphasise endogeneity. 
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associated with slowdowns in measured TFP in the short run.  These first three findings are all consistent 
with the suggestion from the macro data and the evidence from the micro data that IT and ∆O together boost 
productivity growth (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2003, and BBH) and the fourth finding uses micro data to 
confirm the macro suggestion that bursts of (IT) investment slow down measured TFP growth . 
We have in addition, three broad findings that, we believe, add to the extant literature.  The first two 
speak to the question of what determines ∆O.  First, we find that ∆O is affected by competition.  When we 
measure competition by lagged changes in market share we find that firms who lose market share in 
previous periods are statistically significantly more likely to introduce ∆O in the current period.  Second, we 
also find strong effects on the probability of introducing ∆O from ownership.  US-owned firms are much 
more likely to introduce ∆O relative to other non-UK firms who are more likely still relative to UK firms. 
These findings help interpret, we believe, results in Bloom, Sadun and van Reenen (2006) who find that US 
MNEs operating in the UK have higher returns to IT than non-US MNEs operating in the UK.  They 
speculate that this is due to improved O in US MNE but have no data on O.  Our results, which include data 
on ∆O, support this explanation. Our third finding relates to the macro literature.  Our micro estimates imply 
a slowdown in measured TFP growth for firms with growing investment in IT and not undertaking ∆O 
(these might be for example UK firms in the early stages of IT adoption).  This predicted slowdown is in line 
with observed UK TFP growth slowdown in the macro data.5 
As in all empirical studies our findings should be treated with caution due, as we discuss, to 
measurement problems and our short panel.  But our findings are suggestive of a story that might account for 
the IT/productivity growth puzzle set out above.  It is that (a) successful productivity growth needs both IT 
and organisational change; (b) periods of above average investment lower measured TFP growth; (c) 
competition pressures firms to introduce organisational change and (d) US firms, controlling for 
competition, implement organisational change more readily than other firms.  Quite why they do so is not 
something that we can answer with our data.  Nonetheless we regard the finding of interest and suggestive of 
areas for future fruitful work. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  In section 2 we set out a framework to understand the key 
questions involved in our and other approaches.  Section 3 describes the data, section 4 our results for 
productivity, section 5 results for organisational change, section 6 instrumental variables and wider 
implications.  Section 7 summarises and concludes. 
 
                                                   
5
 We also believe that this paper contributes to work on the Community Innovation Survey.  As well as working on 
production functions and IT, that we do not believe has been explored before, we have undertaken a good deal of 
robustness checking of the CIS (comparing with administrative data, text analyses of CIS responses) which we believe 
also contributes to understanding the accuracy of this survey.  See below and the Data Appendix for details. 
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2 Overall approach 
2.1 Simplified model 
We start with a very simple model set out purely to motivate our approach and understand its 
relation with other work. Consider a production function of the form 
 
 ( ( , ), , )IT Pit it it it itY Y F K O X L=  (1) 
 
where i, t denotes firm i in period t, Y is real output, KIT is IT capital stock, O is organisational 
capital, LP denotes workers used in production (explained below) and X are all other factors some of which 
might be observed such as non-IT capital stock KNIT, and some are unobserved.  Two assumptions are 
usually made about (1).  First, it is usually argued that O and KIT might be complementary in production and 
so to capture this we write these two factors within F().6  Second, it is often assumed that not all L workers 
are immediately productive; rather LP  workers are engaged in immediate production, with the remaining LO 
workers are engaged in activities that are not immediately productive (e.g. formal or informal time spent on 
developing new processes) all of which might contribute to future O.  Thus  
 
 (1 ( / ))P O Oit it it it it itL L L L L L= − = −  (2) 
 
Log linearising (1) and using the approximation from (2) that logLP=logL-(LO/L) gives 
 
 ( ) )(54302210 itITititITitititititit OkOkLLlxy ∗+++−++= ααααααα  (3) 
where lower case letters denote logs (and O is upper case since it is a dummy in our data).  Equation 
(3) is a standard production function, with the exception of the kIT and O interaction and the term in (LO/L).  
A first differenced version7 of (3) can be written 
 
 ( ) )(5430221 itITititITitititititit OkOkLLlxy ∆∗∆+∆+∆+∆−∆+∆=∆ αααααα  (4) 
Equations (3) and (4) highlight some questions of interest in the literature.  First, there are a series of 
questions concerning O and kIT: do they interact, does the omission of O overstate the returns to kIT, does O 
or ∆O interact with other variables (e.g. skills, kNIT)?  Second, if investing in IT requires co-investment in O 
                                                   
6The use of interactions to address complementarities follows BBH (p.354). By including only KIT as an interaction 
with O, we are implicity assuming that we do not expect any effect from O on non IT capital.  Athey and Stern (1998) 
present a formal model whereby where organisational design is composed of a number of work practices. 
Complementarity arises, intuitively in the two factor case, where the returns to adopting practice 1 are higher when 
practice 2 has been adopted, see their equation (4).  Our ∆O measure is a dummy, see below, so we are unable to 
precisely estimate underlying continuous functional forms. We model this complementarity by allowing firms who do 
organisational change to have higher returns to their investment in IT. 
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which  takes L away from current production, then (LO/L) rises in periods of IT investment, which, from (4), 
potentially leads to measured TFP growth falling in periods of IT investment; is this a big effect?  Third, 
what determines O (and indeed the other variables)? 
Equations (3) and (4) also highlight some of the problems in answering these questions.  First, data 
on all these variables is rarely found.  Many company level data sets might have data on Y and K but few 
also subdivide K into data on IT and fewer still also have data on O or LP.  Thus it is very hard at the outset 
to measure the returns to kIT and possible interactions with O.  Second, even if one had such data, if O is 
endogenous and correlated with omitted variables in (3) or (4) then such returns and the marginal effects of 
potential interactions are biased.  For example, if managerial quality is not measured and is in X and if better 
managers raise Y and also implement better O then α2 would be upward biased in (3).8  Thus it is hard to 
establish the contribution from O.  
2.2 Existing evidence  
What then is the approach of the literature to these questions?  Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt 
(2002) combine data on O, using a cross-section survey of managers in 1995, with the firms used in 
Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003) who are observed between 1987-94.  The data for these firms is on outputs, 
inputs and in particular, a lot of specific information on computer hardware.  This leaves around 300 large 
US firms in their sample.  They measure O as a linear combination of questions on team working, and the 
extent to which workers have authority over their pace and methods of work.  Since O is a cross section, 
their main results are estimates of (3), where again they have no measures of LO/L.  They find statistically 
significant positive effects on Yit from KITit, Oit and (Oit • KITit) and emphasise the interaction between O and 
KITit. 
Black and Lynch (2004) obtain two cross-sections of data on O for 1993 and 1996, in their case 
indications of the use of high performance work systems, and combine this with a panel of firm data. Their 
data on KIT is a questionnaire response as to whether non-managers use computers.  Estimating both cross 
sections like (3) and panels like (4) they find that high performance workplace practices are associated with 
higher productivity and in particular that the share of non-managers using computers is positively correlated 
with productivity.  Caroli and van Reenen (2001) have French firm data 1992-96.  Their data on ∆O and ∆kIT 
are questionnaire responses on the use of new work organisation and use of new technology.  Their main 
finding is that ∆O is statistically significantly associated with productivity growth particularly when 
interacted with skills but not significantly when interacted with their technology measure. 
                                                                                                                                                                        
7
 Strictly speaking, if (3) is translog (4) should include interaction terms between levels and growth. Here we are only 
trying to set out a broad description of what the current literature is aiming to do. 
8
 Note in passing that the bias might be less serious in (4) to the extent that fixed aspects of managerial quality drop out; 
we shall work with changes in productivity below, but if unobservably more capable managers positively affect ∆y and 
∆O then a bias might still remain.  Note too we shall examine whether ∆O interacts with ∆kIT but not ∆kNIT and argue 
that this is indeed the case.  To ascribe the correlation between ∆O and ∆kIT wholly to endogeneity, it would have to be 
the case that there is an unobserved effect driving ∆O and ∆kIT but not ∆kNIT.  Finally note we shall also present an 
equation explaining ∆O (competition). 
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There are of course a number of studies that look at highly related issues: either using O, but not IT, 
or IT, but not O. Boning, Ichniowski and Shaw (2001) study both the productivity impact of O and the 
determinants of O using data on physical output of US minimills for productivity and teamworking for O.  In 
their study, teamworking boosts productivity and the decision to adopt teamworking is driven by things like 
plant characteristics (i.e. whether the plant is old or not), the complexity of the good produced and older and 
longer tenured managers.  Their focus is not so much on IT however.9 
Turning to the micro studies of IT without data on O, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003) assemble 
company level data on 527 US firms, over an 8 year period, 1987-94 (with some firms in the sample all the 
time and some not) with data on outputs, inputs and computers to estimate equations like (4) which they do 
using a mix of long and short differences.  They have no measures of O or LO/L however.  They find long 
run returns to ∆Kit to exceed short run returns which they interpret as consistent with congruent changes in 
O.  Using UK plant level data, Bloom et al. (2006) construct a panel of data on output and inputs, including 
IT and non-IT capital (as we discuss below, their data comes from a different source to ours).  They have no 
data on O, but instead interact IT capital with a dummy if the firm is part of a US multi-national.  In levels 
and differences such as (3) and (4), such a dummy is positive and significant, in IT-using intensive sectors 
(see their Table 1, columns 5 to 8).  They interpret the dummy as being a measure of superior O in US firms. 
There are also a number of macro studies who have data on IT without data on O.  The most 
relevant to our work is Basu et al. (2003).  They assume that LO workers are used to build future O and 
hence ∆O=f(LO).  From (4), ∆O and ∆kIT are correlated and hence LO is related to ∆kIT.  Thus from (4)  
 
 ( )ITititITititITitititit kOkOklxy ∆∆−∆∗∆+∆+∆+∆+∆=∆ βααααα )(54321  (5) 
i.e. measured TFP growth falls in periods of accelerating IT capital growth (i.e. ∆(∆kIT)>0).  This 
might explain, they argue, the slowdown in EU TFP growth if EU countries are in the initial stages of 
installing IT capital when there is accelerating net investment.10  
A rather smaller literature is concerned with the determinants of O or ∆O.  Nickell, Nicolitsas and 
Patterson (2001) focus on the determinants of ∆Oit, using data on 66 UK manufacturing firms over the 
period 1981-86 who report whether they (a) removed restrictive practices or not and (b) introduced new 
technology.  They also use 98 firms who were surveyed in 1993/4 as regards changes in their management 
                                                   
9
 There is of course a related literature that has no data on IT or on O but looks at a number of proxies that might 
determine O, most notably unions, product market competition or ownership.  On unions for example Clark (1984) and 
Haskel (2005) find a negative effect on US and UK data, whilst Freeman and Medoff (1978) find a positive effect on 
productivity all of which is consistent with unions affecting O.  On competition, Nickell (1996) finds a positive effect 
of increased competitive pressure on TFP growth, consistent with competition affecting O.  On ownership, Doms and 
Jensen (1996) and Criscuolo and Martin (2005) find various effects on TFP of country of ownership, consistent with 
management affecting O. 
10
 This argument is closely related to the investment spikes literature, see e.g. Power (1999), whereby it is argued that 
due to adjustment costs especially high investment leads to an initial fall in productivity.  This approach here captures 
that idea, namely that increased capital, here in IT, requires organisational change, which in turn requires labour input 
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practices.  They find that financial and market pressures, the latter measured by lagged changes in market 
share, are more likely to make firms introduce innovations in O.  Caroli and van Reenen (2001) find that ∆O 
is correlated with relative wages and technology but they do not look at competition (they note this as a topic 
for future work, p.1482). 
 
2.3 Our contribution 
What then is our contribution?  First, we assemble firm level data on almost 6,000 firms where we 
measure inputs and outputs, including ∆kIT and ∆O.  Thus we add what is a rather larger data set to the 
relatively small extant evidence on this question.  We have productivity growth data so we estimate (4) 
where we hope to control for what are potentially a number of unobservables in (3).  Second, we also try to 
understand why some firms do and do not introduce ∆O.  Our hypothesis is that ∆O is related to competition 
and hence we also estimate an equation for ∆O namely 
 
 1 2itO COMPET Zβ β∆ = ∆ +  (6) 
 
where ∆COMPETit is a term to indicate increasing competitive pressure on the firm and Zit are other 
terms which determine the firm’s propensity to introduce ∆O.  Included here will be ownership, specifically 
dummies indicating whether the firm is a US-owned multinational enterprise (MNE), foreign non-US owned 
MNE and UK-owned MNE (with UK domestic firms being the base category).  This will allow us to 
examine whether MNEs of different ownership are more likely to introduce, other things equal, ∆O. 11 
 
3 Data  
The data appendix gives full information on our data, which we summarise briefly here.   
3.1 CIS data 
Our main data are drawn from the Third Community Innovation Survey (CIS3), an official stratified 
survey of firms with more than 10 employees (omitting agriculture, fishing and forestry, public 
administration and defence, education, health and social work) with a 42% response rate.  The questionnaire 
was posted in 2001 and gives productivity and ∆O activity between 1998 and 2000.  Our data is at the line of 
business level, which for shorthand we refer to as a “firm”.  After extensive cleaning we have 5,944 firms in 
the sample, 3,019 in manufacturing and 2,925 in services. 
                                                                                                                                                                        
that takes them away from current production.  Thus a “spike” in investment, or positive net investment, reduces 
measured LP and TFP growth.  We find evidence for this “spike” effect, in terms of IT investment, in our data below. 
11
 Below we also try to instrument IT using data on broadband penetration by region.  Unfortunately, this turns out to 
be a very poor instrument.  Hence the decision to invest in IT, likely an important function of the price of IT which may 
not vary across firms is not modelled here.  The biases however may not be that severe: see footnote 8. 
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3.2 Data on ∆O  
In trying to measure ∆O, Ichniowski and Shaw (2003, p.158) distinguish between a “scientific 
technology shock” and an “organisational technology shock”.  From the production function we might 
interpret this as a distinction between embodied and disembodied changes.  Given how hard to measure this 
is, there are various measures in the literature. BBH for example use data on teamworking as their measure 
of O i.e. something that does not necessarily involve different capital; fast turn around of airliners by low-
cost airlines might be another (as opposed to a computerised booking system to make reservations over the 
web which we might think of as an embodied technology).   Black and Lynch (2003) define O as “workforce 
training, employee voice and work design (including the usage of cross-functional production processes)”.  
Our survey questions on organisational change are as follows: “Wider innovation.  Did your enterprise make 
major changes in the following areas of business structure and practices during the period 1998-2000 and 
how far did business performance improve as a result?”  The options given were “a.  Implementation of new 
or significantly changed corporate strategies e.g. mission statement, market share, b.  Implementation of 
advanced management techniques within your firm e.g. knowledge management, quality circles, c.  
Implementation of new or significantly changed organisational structures e.g. Investors in People, 
diversification, d.  Changing significantly your firms marketing concepts/ strategies e.g. marketing 
methods.”.  Firms are given four response options: “not used” and impact on performance “low”, “medium” 
and “high”.12  We reduced each answer to a 1/0 (yes/no) since the impact part of the answer is too 
endogenous to the production function and might be driven by the subjective judgement of the respondent.  
Answers to (b) and (c) would appear to proxy changes in organisational capital in the firm.  Answers to (a) 
and (d) are more difficult to interpret since they may or may not have involved changes in organisational 
capital.  On the other hand, firms are asked (a) first which might affect their propensity to answer the other 
questions.  For the moment, we combined them but we shall inspect the robustness of this below. 
 A number of points are worth making regarding this measure.  First, the measure is clearly 
not ideal. Presumably, there are many aspects of a firm’s O: teamwork, morale, consultation methods, lean 
production, family-friendly work practices etc. and thus any questionnaire is almost bound to provide only a 
partial measure, as BBH acknowledge.  This suggests that it might be easier to try to measure ∆O, as we try 
to here, as opposed to the level of O.  To the extent that this measure is noisy, it biases us away from finding 
a statistically significant effect. Second, in our data 58% and 51% of firms  in manufacturing and services 
respectively reported implementing ∆O.13 These answers refer to firms ticking any of (a) or (b) or (c) or (d) 
in the question.  It turns out that 41% of firms that ticked any of the alternatives also ticked all boxes and 
55% of firms answering yes to (a) answered yes to (b), (c) and (d).  Indeed, there were very few firms who 
ticked only one or two or three of the boxes.  
                                                   
12
 Note the question asks about major changes and so should exclude minor more routine changes in O. 
13
 The weighted results are qualitatively similar, e.g. the weighted proportion of firms doing some organisational 
change is 0.48 (instead of 0.54).  Weights are provided by the CIS to deal with stratification, but not with non-response. 
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Firms are in addition asked about what are called their technological innovations, called “process” 
and “product” innovations.  We were concerned that process innovations might also incorporate 
disembodied re-organisation such as contracting out, new working methods etc.  As the Data Appendix sets 
out in some detail, many firms who supplied a description of their (major) process innovation stated a 
description such as this.  Thus we included process innovations as part of ∆O but tested as well for 
excluding them.  As a matter of data, fewer firms report process innovation: 25% and 16% in manufacturing 
and services respectively.  Thus as a whole, 63% and 54% of firms respectively implement both 
organisational change and/or process innovation.  
3.3 Data on IT  
We next require data on IT.  The CIS data asks firms to report total investment in 1998 and in 2000.  
It then asks firms, in the section on innovation expenditure, to report expenditure on “Acquisition of 
machinery and equipment (including computer hardware) in connection with product or process 
innovation.”  We use these data to measure the fraction of investment that we will call IT investment.14  To 
verify the data, the Data Appendix documents a number of checks: first, these data are strongly correlated 
with IT-related text in the answers to the process innovation question; second, these data are also correlated 
with the industry share of IT investment constructed using two independent data sets; third, merging these 
data with the Annual Business Inquiry (ABI) production survey data and using the investment data to 
construct an IT and non-IT capital stock yields very similar results to US and UK results.  Thus we regard 
this measure as one of advanced capital equipment and well correlated with IT investment. 
We find an average of 0.021 for IIT/Y and an average IIT/I of 0.10.  The ONS Volume Index of 
Capital Services project reports an average IIT/I of 0.13 using their national accounts industry data (see Data 
Appendix). So our data compare well with this. 
3.4 Data on output and other controls in the production function 
To estimate the rest of (4) we require data on changes in output, employment and materials.  As 
mentioned above, the CIS collects data on turnover and employment in 1998 and 2000; so we construct 
changes (of both output and all inputs) as two-year log differences. One might worry that firms answer this 
inaccurately and so we matched the CIS data with ABI data drawn in 1998 and 2000 to check.15  The 
correlation coefficient between (logs of all variables) turnover on the CIS and the ABI data was 0.96 and 
0.92 in 1998 and 2000 and for employment, 0.92 and 0.66.  These correlations are reassuringly high, 
although the correlations on log changes in turnover, employment and labour productivity were lower at 
0.46, 0.57 and 0.30.  There are a number of points here.  First, the CIS asks for FTE employment whereas 
the ABI data asks for headcounts.  Second, as is well recognised in panel data work, a small amount of 
                                                   
14
 The data appendix describes this.  Briefly, we lack the data to construct ∆kIT and so we use (IIT/Y) as a 
regressor, where I is investment in IT. To measure IT we use data from this question on IT above and to measure 
overall investment, we use questionnaire data on total investment. The appendix sets out a number of checks on the IT 
and investment data against other sources. 
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random difference between two levels might translate into a larger difference when changes in the levels are 
being considered. 
Further, the CIS has no data on material use.  Since materials constitute over 60% of gross output on 
average and changes in material use are positively correlated with investment (correlation of 0.20) on the 
ABI data, we felt it was important to try to include materials in our work.  Thus for the around 1,000 firms 
who are both on the CIS and the ABI data we used materials as reported on the ABI data.  For the other 
firms, we interpolated materials by using a linear regression of materials on turnover and other inputs, and 
inserted a dummy in the regressions where materials were interpolated. 
Finally, firms are also asked about their product innovations, which we shall use as a control for 
unobserved changes in firm-specific prices.  Firms are asked how much of their turnover is accounted for by 
product innovation; our data shows this to be around 7% of turnover.  
We use these results in Table 1 to look at innovation by various dimensions: firm employment, 
labour productivity and IT use, where classification is relative to average employment, average labour 
productivity and average IT intensity in the relevant three-digit industry.  As Table 1 shows, large, highly 
productive and high IT users all show higher fractions of the self-reported innovation measures.  We also 
show ∆O by ownership status.  US MNEs are most likely to implement ∆O, followed by UK MNEs and 
foreign MNEs, with domestic firms less likely to do so. 
4 Econometric implementation and results of production function 
4.1 Econometric implementation of the production function 
Looking at (1), let us add to X, KNIT, non- IT capital stock and M, materials.  We do not have firm-
specific price deflators, Pi, but industry-specific deflators, PI, so that our measured real output is (PiYi/PI). 
Hence we write (4) in log linear form with an interaction between ∆O and ∆kIT 
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Moving term by term, we first have the question of how to measure ∆kNIT and ∆kIT.  This is set out 
fully in the Data Appendix, section 5, but briefly, since we have data on investment, I, we enter (INIT/Y) and 
(IIT/Y) respectively and interpret the coefficient as rates of return.16  Second, terms in ∆O are discussed 
above.  Third, measures of ∆l come directly from the data and measures of ∆m are interpolated from the ABI 
data as explained above.  We do not have a direct measure of ∆(LO/L) but look at this more in the robustness 
checks below.  Fourth, we do not have plant level data to measure ∆(pit-pIt) but we do have data on whether 
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 The matched capital expenditure on the CIS and ARD are also similar.  
16
 Since both I and Y are in nominal terms, these are gross rates of return and therefore include depreciation.  Since IT 
is typically supposed to depreciate much faster than non-IT then one would expect these rates to differ.  For our 
purposes our main interest is exploring the interaction with ∆O.  It is also worth noting that since IIT is measured worse 
than INTT it is likely that its coefficient is biased downwards.   
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the firm has introduced a product innovation and if so what share of output such an innovation accounts for 
which we use.  We believe this to be of interest since as Bresnahan et al (2002) remark; the improved 
process due to IT is often used for improved products as well.  Thus we can, to some extent, get some 
measure of the improved revenues controlling for improved products. Fifth, to control for industry effects, 
we express all variables in terms of their deviation from their three-digit mean.  Finally, we include a 
number of other dummies: 12 regional dummies, λR and dummies for start-up and merger status, λS, i (that 
might temporarily affect the output/input relation).  Thus we estimate  
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where all variables are in deviation from their three-digit mean and we transformed the right hand 
side variable to be productivity growth.   It is important to note that whilst the use of differences controls for 
fixed omitted factors, we have relegated -∆(LO/L) to the equation error.  We discuss robustness to this below. 
4.2 Results 
Table 2 sets out the results of estimating (8).  Column 1 shows the results excluding the interacted 
terms in ∆O.  The marginal returns to (I/Y)NIT and (I/Y)IT are 0.21 and 0.30 respectively and the term in 
product innovation is significant.  Column 2 adds the interacted ∆O•(I/Y)IT term.  This is positive and 
significant at conventional levels with the coefficient on (I/Y)IT much reduced.  Thus, this column has an 
interesting interpretation, namely that the measured marginal returns to IT investment are 12% with no 
organisational change, but an additional 23% with organisational change.  Finally, column 3 adds an 
interaction between ∆O and the non-IT investment term, ∆O•(I/Y)NIT.  This is insignificant. 
Taken together, these columns suggest significant returns to IT, extra returns to IT and ∆O 
performed together, that lower the measured returns to IT alone, and no extra returns to non-IT and ∆O 
performed together.  All these findings are consistent with BBH’s results for the US and suggest there is 
something particular about the relation between ∆O and IT investment rather than all types of investment. 
How robust are these results?  We investigated a large number of issues.  First is the issue of outliers 
and influential observations.  In working with a single cross-section of differenced data it is potentially 
important to examine if possible outliers might unduly influence our results (note that the outliers may or 
may not be “rogue” observations).  Thus columns 4 to 6 of Table 2 control for influential observations using 
the method proposed by Belsey, Kuh and Welsch (1980).17 As the columns show, this method removes 723 
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 The Belsey et al (1980) method focuses on each coefficient and measures the difference between the regression 
coefficient when the ith observation is alternatively missing and included, the difference being scaled by the standard 
error of the coefficient.  Following them, we identified influential observations as those observations whose deletion 
generates absolute changes higher than 2/√n in any of the explanatory variables in the regression.  This method is more 
general than looking at, say, residuals, since it controls for large leverage.  (Consider for example explanatory 
observations all clustered together bar one single outlying observation. OLS fits a regression line through this single 
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observations.  The coefficients on (I/Y)IT and (I/Y)NIT fall somewhat, whilst the coefficient and statistical 
significance of the interacted ∆O•(I/Y)IT term rises.  The interaction between (I/Y)NIT and ∆O remains non-
significant.  Thus our results are robust to removing influential observations, indeed are rather improved by 
this. 
The second robustness check is to look at the relation for different industries.  If IT is a general 
purpose technology, then we might expect its influence on productivity, controlling for ∆O to be pervasive.  
Columns 7 to 10 of Table 2 then explore these results by manufacturing and services and small and large 
firms.  As these columns show, the differences between manufacturing and services and large and small 
firms for our key input and interacted ∆O•(I/Y)IT coefficients are small. More formally, we ran the basic 
regression interacting the ∆O•(I/Y)IT term with dummies for small firms in services, large firms in services 
and large firms in manufacturing, the omitted category being small firms in manufacturing.  None of these 
dummies even approached statistical significance (results not reported but available from the authors).  
The third robustness check is for the omission of -∆(LO/L).  One way to control partially for this is to 
add (Y/L)it-1 to (8).  Firms with low levels of productivity in the previous period might have done so because 
they had high levels of LO/L, which would affect their likelihood of changing LO/L.  In addition, quite apart 
from measuring omitted -∆(LO/L), including (Y/L)it-1 might also control for transitory shocks to productivity 
due to e.g. measurement problems etc. or that firms with initially low levels of productivity have more 
opportunity to learn from other more successful ones, so raising productivity growth if such improvements 
are not measured in ∆O.18  Also, this term might help control for the omitted capital intensity terms due to 
only having data on I and not ∆k, see Data Appendix, section 5.  Thus columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 add 
lagged productivity levels.  This does not make too much difference to the interacted terms coefficients, but 
reduces their statistical significance somewhat.   
Columns 3 and 4 try another possible variable to pick up ∆(LO/L), namely investment accelerations.  
As discussed above in relation to the investment spike literature, if investment accelerations require 
additional staff time to implement, then they could proxy for ∆(LO/L).19  As the table shows, these terms are 
indeed negative, suggesting that measured TFP growth falls during investment accelerations.  This is also 
consistent with the macro evidence cited above; see section 6 below for further discussion. Note the 
significance of the interacted ∆O•(I/Y)IT term remains.   
                                                                                                                                                                        
data point, which may not have a large residual but has a severe influence in the estimated coefficients which this 
method should detect). 
18
 Note that because we are including industry dummies, lagged labour productivity captures the productivity gap 
between each plant and the technological frontier (since the frontier is absorbed by the industry effects). 
19
 The dummy for investment accelerations is built as follows: (i) we compute the investment rate for each plant in each 
year between 1998 to 2000, where current investment is normalized by using current turnover, (ii) we compute the 
average investment rate for each firm over the three considered years and (iii) we define that we observe an investment 
acceleration if the current investment rate in year 2000 is larger than the average investment rate. Note that this 
definition of investment acceleration is very close to the idea of investment spikes used in the empirical literature of 
lumpy investment models (see Power, 1998 for example).  
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The fourth robustness check concerns the use of survey data.  It might be felt that firms do not 
answer such surveys well, particularly when firms are asked to recall turnover, investment and employment 
from two years ago.  To explore this, we took the CIS sample of 5,942 used above and matched them to ABI 
data, leaving us with 1,008 observations that have complete output, employment and materials data in 1998 
and 2000.  It is worth noting however, that the matched firms are mostly in manufacturing and are large 
since the ABI data are mostly for larger firms.  Since the ARD does not ask IT investment until 2001, we use 
the CIS IT data as in the regressions above.  The results are set out in columns 5 to 7 of Table 3.  The 
coefficients on (I/Y)IT are similar, although the ∆O•(I/Y)IT terms falls in insignificance, perhaps due to the 
preponderance of manufacturing firms in the data. 
Finally, we undertook a number of other robustness checks (not reported in full, available on 
request).  We added two skills measures, specified the ∆O to be the wider innovation term, used the BBH 
standardised measure, namely the standardised sum of the standardised answers but all these left the (I/Y)IT 
and ∆O•(I/Y)IT terms largely unaffected.20 
 
5 Econometric implementation and results of ∆O equation 
5.1 Econometric implementation 
Our estimating equation for ∆O builds on (6) and can be written 
itIititititit MNESIZEMULTIPLANTMSHAREO ελββββ +++++∆=∆ −− 231222111                  (9) 
 
where ∆MSHARE i,t-1=(Yi/YI)1998-(Yi/YI)1997, MULTIPLANT  is a dummy valued at 1 if the firm is part 
of a larger group and 0 otherwise SIZEt-1= lnLi, 1998, and recall that ∆O is defined between 1998 and 2000. 
MNE is a vector of three separate dummies taking the value one if a US MNE, a foreign non-US MNE or  a 
UK MNE.  We also experiment with a dummy for exporting, where exporters are only domestic non MNE 
firms who export.  λI are five-digit industry dummies. 
A number of points are worth making.  First, concerning the measurement of competition, we wish 
to measure changes in the intensity of competition, since ∆O is the dependent variable.  As noted by Nickell 
(1996) current levels of market share are likely endogenous to current O, where a high level of O would lead 
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 If we use the BBH standardised method applied to our ∆O variables in our productivity growth regressions we obtain 
coefficients on ∆O and ∆O•(I/Y)IT  of -0.002 (t=0.75) and 0.04 (t=1.21).  For comparison, they find 0.02 and 0.02 (in 
their productivity level regressions).  It is worth remarking on the finding that ∆O is hardly statistically significant in 
any results and sometimes (insignificantly) negative.  One possibility is that the 1/0 nature of the variable is too discrete 
to capture what is likely very different scales of ∆O between different firms, but when interacted with I/YIT it attains 
some scale.  The other possibility is that, as theory suggests, it is biased by the omission of ∆(LO/L).  There is some 
moderate support for this from the regressions that include the lagged productivity level and the investment 
acceleration term.  Here the ∆O term, whilst remaining negative, tends to zero and shows a considerable increase in its 
standard error, suggesting that when some controls for this omitted variable are included, the ∆O term moves toward its 
theoretically predicted sign. 
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to high MSHARE.  Lagged changes however should be a reasonably good measure of increased competitive 
pressure on firms and so (9) is interpreted as saying that a past reduction in market share is symptomatic of 
increased competitive pressure which raises the subsequent probability of implementing ∆O.  Thus we 
expect a negative co-efficient on ∆MSHAREi,t-1 in (9) and since endogeneity bias would give a positive 
coefficient, the estimated co-efficient is likely a lower bound on the true effect.  
Second, we wish to use lagged ∆MSHARE.  We have Yi and Li in 1998 on the CIS but the earliest 
period where we have YI for manufacturing and services from the business register is 1997.  So 
∆MSHAREi,t-1 is a change between 1998 and 1997 i.e. the first period of the CIS and the year before it.  
Third, the share of the three digit (we also experiment with four and five digit) industry is a share of a 
market defined on the supply side, since SIC industries are implicitly defined as collections of firms with 
higher elasticities of technical substitution.  Much competition analysis however looks at markets as defined 
on the demand side with high elasticities of demand substitution.  With almost 6,000 firms we simply cannot 
undertake analysis of the demand side for each firm and so have to make do with this measure.  Fourth, a 
new entrant in 1998 does not of course have a market share for 1997 so we set their change equal to their 
market share in 1998, while for the rest of unmatched firms we imputed the variation in the market shares 
using their size and sector medians (when we worked only with the matched sample we obtained the same 
results).21  
What is the theoretical rationale behind (9)?  We think of it as a reduced form describing two basic 
approaches to the determinants of O.  The first might be to regard O as reflecting knowledge capital and 
competition forces firms either to invest in more acquiring such capital or to use such inputs more 
effectively.  A second way of viewing O is that organisational capital also includes the organisation of work 
which can be summarised by the effort that workers apply to tasks.  In models of effort under imperfect 
competition (see e.g. Haskel, 1991 and Nickell, Wadhwani and Wall, 1992) workers bargain over wages and 
effort with firms who have some product market power.  With tighter product market competition, under 
certain conditions, workers raise their bargained effort.22  
5.2 Results 
Table 4 shows the results of estimating (9) (by probit since ∆Oi is a 1/0 variable, and in the table we 
report marginal effects).  Note the number of observations is 5,944 as before but shows up as 5,926 in the 
table since we include five-digit dummies that perfectly explain some of the observations.  Column 1 shows 
the marginal effect of ∆MSHAREit-2 where the only other controls are five digit industry dummies, 12 
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 In the regressions below where we use changes in market share we add a dummy for imputed observations. We also 
experimented with lagged growth, since slow growing firms might be more inclined to invest in ∆O since the 
opportunity cost of labour taken away from production to so invest is lower when sales are lower.  Or, they are less 
inclined to invest in ∆O if such changes, which might conceivably involve job loss, are more acceptable to workers in 
growing companies (where employment would grow by less than it would otherwise do, but at least not fall). In fact, 
lagged growth was positively signed and significant and improved the t statistic on ∆MSHARE. 
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regional dummies, 3 dummies for start-up/merger status and a dummy for the cases where we have to 
impute ∆MSHAREit-2 (the result are robust to omitting this).  The ∆MSHAREit-2 term is negative, indicating 
that falling market share between 1997 and 1998 makes firms more likely to introduce ∆O between 1998 
and 2000.  The coefficient is significant at the 30% level.  Column 2 adds a multiplant dummy MULTI to 
control for economies of scale and scope in introducing ∆O.  This is very significant and the effect of 
∆MSHAREit-2  strengthens somewhat.  Column 3 introduces log employment (in 1998), which also shows 
economies of scale and scope but renders the effect of MULTI insignificant; importantly however, it further 
strengthens the effect of ∆MSHAREit-2.  Thus this very austere specification supports the idea that increased 
competition makes firms introduce organisational change.  As noted above, the effect when using lags is 
more revealing of the true causal effect (which of course we cannot estimate without a natural experiment) 
since using current data would likely induce a positive correlation as firms introducing ∆Oi likely grow 
market share.  Since the endogeneity bias likely biases the effect toward being positive, the true causal effect 
is likely more negative than the negative effect that we find. 
Column 4 adds the MNE dummies: the results are most interesting.  Looking at the coefficients, 
relative to domestic firms (the omitted category), US, non-US and UK MNEs are 10%, 7% and 3% more 
likely to introduce ∆O (with the last effect insignificant).  This is consistent with the idea that these firms 
can transfer information from other plants (in this case in other countries) and so introduce ∆O.  Lastly 
column 5 adds the lagged exporting dummy and here finds that the marginal effect from exporters and UK 
MNEs is about the same.  It is worth noting that these effects are economically significant too, with US 
MNEs 15% more likely to introduce ∆O than, for example, UK domestic firms. 
6 Other checks 
6.1 IV and systems estimation 
We used the determinants of ∆O in (9) as instruments for ∆O in the productivity growth equation (8)
The simplest method, which turns out to be representative, is to use ∆MSHARE, SIZE and the MNE 
dummies from Table 4, column 4 as instruments for the ∆O and ∆O•(I/Y)IT  terms in Table 2, column 5.  The 
results of this are reported in Table 5 column 2 (column 1 repeats the baseline result for comparison).  The 
coefficient on ∆O is positive, contrary to the OLS term, and that on ∆O•(I/Y)IT  is also positive of lower 
magnitude than the OLS effect and not well determined.  Column 3 obtains very similar results using 
iterative 3SLS. 
What is the interpretation of these results?  There are a number of points.  First, as the Table shows, 
the Hausman test was never significant, indicating that our IV results were never significantly different from 
the OLS results. Second, as Stock and Staiger (1998) point out, IV results are biased toward OLS results if 
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 The conditions essentially depend upon worker preferences over wages and effort: if workers’ marginal disutility 
from increases in effort are sufficiently large and their disutility from falls in wages is sufficiently small then workers 
might agree steep enough wage cuts in the face of increased competition to be able to take effort reductions too. 
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the instruments have little explanatory power.  However, as the Table shows, our first step F tests returned F 
values above 10 so we do not think that this is driving the closeness of the OLS and IV results.  Third, our 
instruments were valid as tested by the Hansen J statistic.  In sum, we do not claim that our OLS results are 
true causal effects, but rather that for the choice of instruments we have here (which statistically are 
reasonably strong), the OLS results are statistically the same as our IV results. Finally, we estimated the two 
equations as a SURE system, and as column 4 shows, the coefficients are not much changed from the OLS 
results.  
Finally, it is worth remarking that we did try to find instruments for the decision to invest in IT due 
to the fact that under complementarity this decision should be taken simultaneously with the decision to 
carry out organisational change. The problem, however, is to find convincing instruments for an investment 
variable like this in a cross section sample. We try with different alternatives such as using information 
about the IT infrastructure in the district where the firm is located (e.g. if there is broadband access at the 
firm postal address) or if the firm is located in one of the so-called “assisted areas” for business support. 
None of these alternatives rendered satisfactory results: typically the instrument was not well correlated with 
IT investment.  The consequences of this, in our context, might not be too serious however.  First, as BBH 
note, our results confirm the complementarity idea that investment in IT also requires complementary ∆O 
investment.  Second, the coefficient on the IT term in the production function does not appear to produce 
implausible returns.  Third, it is unlikely that our results are entirely due to unobserved managerial ability 
since that would affect both ∆kIT  and also ∆kNIT . 
 
6.2 Ownership 
We have three further comparisons with other work.  As mentioned above, Bloom,  et al. (2006) 
estimate firm-level regressions of output on IT capital, non-IT capital, labour and materials.  They have no 
data on ∆O, so they interact their IT capital terms with a dummy for multi-national enterprise (MNE) status.  
Their key finding with respect to this paper is that US MNEs have a positive and significant interactive 
(US_MNE•kIT) term in levels and with fixed effects for IT-Using intensive sectors (see their Table 1, 
columns 4 and 7).  They argue that US ownership proxies better organisational and specifically managerial 
capital at the firm.   
How does this (US_MNE•kIT)effect compare with our ∆O•(I/Y)IT  effect here?  Recall that we find a 
positive ∆O•(I/Y)IT  effect on productivity growth and also a positive effect of US MNEs on ∆O.  Thus there 
are (at least) two interpretations.  The first is that US MNEs perform more ∆O, and hence the Bloom et al 
(2006) paper is a reduced form.  The second is that in addition to MNEs performing more ∆O, their ∆O has a 
higher marginal impact than in non-MNEs.  We look at these issues in Table 5 column 5 which drops the ∆O 
and ∆O*(I/Y)IT terms and replaces them instead with US_MNE and US_MNE*(I/Y), where US_MNE is a 
dummy taking the value 1 if the firm is owned by a US company and zero otherwise. The new terms have 
just the same pattern as in Bloom et al (2006), namely an insignificant effect from US_MNE (recall the 
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dependent variable is productivity growth so this is consistent with a significant effect on productivity 
levels) but a positive and almost significant interacted US_MNE*(I/Y)IT term. 
Column 6 adds back in the ∆O and ∆O*(I/Y)IT terms.  Statistically speaking, the ∆O*(I/Y)IT term has 
a lower standard error than the US_MNE*(I/Y)IT term.  Thus one interpretation of their results is that 
US_MNE does indeed proxy ∆O.  Another possibility is that there is an additional effect, namely that not 
only do US MNEs undertake more ∆O, but that the marginal impact of such ∆O is greater in a US MNE that 
in other organisations.  This is setting our data a strong test, but we explored this in column 7 by interacting 
∆O*(I/Y)IT with the US_MNE dummy.  The result is intriguing, with a positive and significant at 10% effect 
of both ∆O*(I/Y)IT and also ∆O*US_MNEit*(I/Y)IT.  Taken literally, the returns to IT, from column  4 are 
12% with no ∆O for non-US firms, 31% (0.1236+0.2054) for IT investment undertaken with ∆O for non-US 
firms and 90% (0.1236+0.2054+0.5882) for IT investment with ∆O for US firms.  Perhaps uncovering these 
exact numbers is placing too much strain on our data (although recall that these are gross returns for IT 
capital that include depreciation which is often measured at 33% for computers), but nonetheless we believe 
that our results complement the Bloom, et al. (2005) work and support their argument that the unmeasured 
factor behind the MNE dummy in their paper is superior organisational capital.23   
 
6.3 Competition 
Papers such as Nickell (1996), Disney, Haskel and Heden (2001) enter lagged ∆MSHARE directly 
into the production function, with no measures of IT or ∆O to test if changes in competition affects 
productivity growth.  To compare with their results we dropped the ∆O and ∆O*(I/Y)IT terms in (8) and 
replaced them instead with ∆MSHAREit-1 and ∆MSHAREit-1*(I/Y)IT where we expect both terms to have a 
negative sign since the relation between ∆O and ∆MSHAREit-1 is negative.  We obtain coefficients of: -0.014 
(t=1.48) and -0.84 (t=1.26) respectively, which are signed consistently with the other work.  The implied 
elasticity at sample mean is 0.02%, lower than the implied elasticities of between 2% and 4% in the Nickell 
(1996) and Disney et al (2001) papers, but as Disney et al (2001) show using a 12 year panel, the elasticity 
falls as the number of panel years falls due to selection effects. 
Finally, instead of dropping the ∆O and ∆O*(I/Y)IT terms and replacing them with ∆MSHAREit-1 and 
∆MSHAREit-1*(I/Y)IT if we include ∆O and ∆O*(I/Y)IT  and simply add the ∆MSHAREit-1 and ∆MSHAREit-
1*(I/Y)IT terms we obtain the following coefficients and t statistics; respectively -0.0087 (1.71), 0.24(3.44), –
0.015 (t=1.54) and –0.73 (t=1.08).  An F test for the two latter additional terms for ∆MSHAREit-1 and 
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 There is a slight complication in comparing our results to their interacted results with fixed effects.  Since we 
estimate in differences, and use ∆O, the closest comparison to their work is their levels regressions with fixed effects.  
All their input terms are specified as deviations from four digit industry means.  Thus their interacted term with fixed 
effects represents the interaction of MNE status with the deviation from the company average relative input level, 
where the relative input level is relative to the 4 digit industry mean.  Variation in this measure can occur with changes 
in IT investment relative to the firm-industry average with no change in MNE status and also changes in MNE status 
with no change in investment.  
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∆MSHAREit-1*(I/Y)IT suggests they can be excluded from this regression.  Along with the finding that ∆O is 
affected by ∆MSHAREit-1 this is consistent with the interpretation that the production with just ∆MSHARE in 
it is a reduced form describing that rising competition raises organisational change and so productivity 
growth.  
6.4 Organisational change, IT and the UK slowdown in productivity growth 
We started the paper with the observation that the literature aims to better understand the business 
process of translating IT to productivity, the TFP growth slowdown in Europe and why some firms institute 
∆O and some not.  We may use our production function to get some sense of the first two questions by, 
following BBH, simulating the impact on productivity growth of firms who implement ∆O and IT 
investment to different extents.  To do this, we calculate the implied change in per annum TFP growth when 
firms are either high or low in their implementation of ∆O, (I/Y) and ∆(I/Y) (using column 4 of Table 3, 
where high and low refers to firms at the 90th and 10th percentiles of the relevant distributions). Consider first 
then a firm who is at the 90th percentile of the distribution of firms doing ∆O, (I/Y) and ∆(I/Y).  Such a firm 
has fall in measured TFP growth of productivity of 0.85% per year.  The reason of course is the negative 
effect of the ∆(I/Y) term.  Thus we might interpret this as showing the extent of the productivity slowdown 
in a firm in, for example, the initial stages of IT implementation when investment is necessarily large to 
move to a desired capital level.  A firm who does not implement ∆O (strictly is at the 10th percentile of ∆O) 
suffers a measured TFP growth fall even more of 1.25% pa.   Finally, firms implementing ∆O and (I/Y) but 
with no acceleration in investment have a rise in TFP growth of 0.75% pa. 
How do these numbers compare with the macro numbers?  Basu et al, (2003 table 5) document a fall 
in UK gross output TFP growth in what they call their well-measured industries of 0.79% pa between 1990-
95 and 1995-2000.  This slowdown seems consistent with the predicted slowdown from our micro data for 
firms in the first stages of IT implementation both with and without organisational change (slowdowns of 
0.85% pa and 1.25% pa respectively).  To compare this, Basu et al (2003, table 4) document a speedup in 
US gross output TFP growth in well-measured industries of 0.62% pa  between 1990-95 and 1995-2000.  If 
we interpret the US economy as one implementing ∆O and investing in IT at a steady rate, this number 
compares quite well with our results at the micro level (of 0.75% pa).  Finally, using data for the UK, Oulton 
and Srinivasan (2005) suggest that the acceleration in investment in IT lowered TFP growth by 0.45% pa 
(although investment capital deepening raised TFP growth by 0.85% per annum).   
 
7 Conclusion 
This paper has used data for UK firms to examine the relation between productivity growth, IT 
investment and organisational change. Consistent with the small number of other micro studies we find (a) 
IT appears to have high returns in a growth accounting sense when one omits ∆O, but when ∆O is included 
the IT returns are greatly reduced: (b) IT and ∆O interact in their effect on productivity growth; (c) There is 
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no impact on productivity growth from ∆O and non-IT investment.  Some new findings are (a), we find that 
∆O is affected by competition and (b) US-owned firms are much more likely to introduce ∆O relative to 
other MNEs and exporters who are more likely still relative to UK domestic only firms, (c) our numbers 
seem to compare quite well with the macro evidence in documenting a UK measured TFP growth 
slowdown.  Of course one should be cautious about these results given measurement error and the attendant 
difficulties of empirical work.  But they support the idea that gains from IT need re-organisation to produce 
measured productivity growth and that initial IT investment slows measured productivity growth down.  Our 
results also support the idea that US MNEs undertake more organisational change others things equal.  This 
suggests that the UK slowdown relative to the US is a combination of later IT investment and less 
organisational change, the latter which might be due to less competitive pressure. 
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Table 1: Organisational change and firm’s characteristics 
  Observations Proportion with ∆O=1 
 Relative to  
3-dig industry 
mean 
  
Size(t-1) Above 2,691 0.11 
 Below 3,253 -0.09 
LP(t-1) Above 2,806 0.03 
 Below 3,138 -0.02 
IT Above 1,091 0.23 
 Below 4,853 -0.05 
    
Ownership   
US MNE 191 0.80 
Non US MNE 413 0.75 
UK MNE 495 0.76 
Domestic 4,845 0.54 
Total 5,944 0.58 
Note: The first row is the unweighted proportion of the whole sample who implemented organisational change.  To 
construct the middle top panel of the table we calculate the three digit average of row and column variables.  The cell 
reported is the average of the deviation from the three-digit average of the row variable for all firms classified by the 
column variable.  Thus the second row right cell says that firms who are above average lagged size, with the average 
being taken relative to the three digit lagged size, have implemented organisational change 11 percentage points above  
the three-digit industry mean organisation change.  The bottom panel shows the average fraction of firms who have 
implemented organisational change for each ownership category, where MNE stands for multi-national enterprise. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using CIS3 
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Table 2: Regressions estimates of productivity growth equation (8) 
(dependent variable ∆ln(Y/L)it, all variables measured as deviation from three-digit mean) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  All obs All obs All obs 
Drop infl 
obs 
Drop infl 
obs 
Drop infl 
obs 
Manuf Svs Small Large 
∆lnLit  -0.5782 -0.5778 -0.5783 -0.5662 -0.5664 -0.5666 -0.5521 -0.582 -0.5824 -0.5354 
 [20.56]*** [20.55]*** [20.62]*** [53.98]*** [54.02]*** [54.03]*** [36.81]*** [39.52]*** [45.02]*** [28.81]*** 
∆lnMit 0.2553 0.2552 0.2552 0.2652 0.2651 0.2652 0.2638 0.2661 0.2734 0.2482 
 [12.06]*** [12.06]*** [12.07]*** [37.07]*** [37.08]*** [37.09]*** [26.08]*** [26.11]*** [30.79]*** [20.03]*** 
 (I/Y)NITit  0.2085 0.2074 0.15 0.1514 0.1509 0.1354 0.175 0.1308 0.1297 0.1781 
 [5.24]*** [5.21]*** [2.07]** [9.28]*** [9.25]*** [5.70]*** [7.53]*** [5.70]*** [6.26]*** [6.57]*** 
 (I/Y)ITit  0.2991 0.1179 0.112 0.2466 0.0773 0.075 0.1365 -0.0222 0.0297 0.1212 
 [3.64]*** [1.73]* [1.62] [6.75]*** [1.37] [1.33] [1.99]** [0.18] [0.37] [1.87]* 
∆lnpit-∆lnpIt 0.065 0.0623 0.0614 0.0559 0.055 0.0548 0.0506 0.0588 0.0266 0.0962 
 [2.13]** [2.03]** [2.01]** [3.47]*** [3.40]*** [3.39]*** [2.30]** [2.48]** [1.23] [3.99]*** 
∆Oit -0.0072 -0.0101 -0.0187 -0.0052 -0.007 -0.0088 -0.0083 -0.0054 -0.0041 -0.0082 
 [0.75] [1.03] [1.59] [1.07] [1.39] [1.50] [1.15] [0.77] [0.64] [0.93] 
∆Oit (I/Y)ITit  0.2349 0.2395  0.2009 0.2034 0.1355 0.3194 0.2192 0.1916 
  [1.98]** [2.01]**  [2.89]*** [2.92]*** [1.59] [2.24]** [2.23]** [2.12]** 
∆Oit  (I/Y)NITit   0.0911   0.0227     
   [1.21]   [0.76]     
Observations 5944 5944 5944 5221 5221 5221 2717 2504 3297 1924 
R-squared 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.4 0.45 0.45 0.38 
F-Stat 25.49 24.41 23.52 159.6 152.81 146.12 74.29 82.19 105.55 48.82 
RMSE 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
Note: Robust t-test in brackets, equations include 12 regional dummies, dummy for start-up and dummies for imputed inputs and organisational change. The impact of 
influential observations is controlled by using the method proposed by Belsey, Kuh and Welsch (1980) see text. 
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Table 3: Robustness checks of Table 2: add lagged productivity levels, investment accelerations and use ABI 
data 
(Dependent variable ∆ln(Y/L)it, all variables measured as deviation from three-digit mean) 
 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
CIS data  CIS data CIS data  CIS data  ABI data ABI data ABI data 
∆lnLit  -0.5557 -0.5554 -0.5581 -0.5583 -0.7974 -0.7974 -0.7974 
 
[19.74]*** [19.73]*** [52.05]*** [52.09]*** [15.88]*** [15.87]*** [15.84]*** 
∆lnMit 0.2437 0.2435 0.2615 0.2614 0.4089 0.4092 0.4091 
 
[11.56]*** [11.56]*** [36.62]*** [36.63]*** [12.88]*** [12.88]*** [12.86]*** 
 (I/Y)NITit  0.1787 0.1778 0.1506 0.15 0.2316 -0.4195 -0.4218 
 
[4.58]*** [4.56]*** [9.17]*** [9.13]*** [1.95]* [1.07] [1.06] 
 (I/Y)ITit  0.2477 0.0857 0.2464 0.0907 0.18 0.1794 0.2161 
 
[3.08]*** [1.32] [6.69]*** [1.62] [2.83]*** [2.82]*** [1.56] 
∆lnpit-∆lnpIt 0.0748 0.0723 0.0577 0.0569 0.0849 0.0851 0.0855 
 
[2.45]** [2.36]** [3.58]*** [3.52]*** [1.70]* [1.70]* [1.71]* 
∆Oit -0.0008 -0.0034 -0.0024 -0.0041 -0.013 -0.016 -0.0108 
 
[0.08] [0.35] [0.50] [0.81] [0.80] [0.96] [0.49] 
∆Oit ∆(I/Y)ITit  0.2101  0.1844  0.6708 0.6735 
 
 [1.82]* 
 [2.68]***  [1.63] [1.62] 
∆Oit  (I/Y)NITit       -0.0481 
 
  
  
  [0.34] 
∆(I/Y)it    -0.0154 -0.0151    
 
  [3.37]*** [3.29]***    
ln(Y/L)
 it-1 -0.0475 -0.0473 -0.013 -0.013    
 
[4.97]*** [4.95]*** [3.33]*** [3.34]***    
Observations 5944 5944 5221 5221 1008 1008 1008 
R-squared 0.31 0.31 0.43 0.43 0.70 0.70 0.70 
F-Stat 24.58 23.59 146.88 141.16    
RMSE 0.31 0.31 0.16 0.16 0.22 0.22 0.22 
Note: Robust t-test in brackets, equations include 12 regional dummies, dummy for start-up and dummies for 
imputed inputs and organisational change. Columns (1) and (2) control for lagged labour productivity, Columns (3) and 
(4) controls for investment accelerations and lag labour productivity. Columns (5) to (7) controls use ABI data on Y. L, 
M.   
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Table 4: Probit estimates of ∆O equation (9) 
(dependent variable ∆O, 0/1 variable, estimation by probit, numbers here are marginal effects ) 
 
   1 2  3  4  5  
∆MSHAREit-2  -0.0298 -0.0325 -0.0757 -0.0754 -0.0743 
 [1.01] [1.13] [1.97]** [1.95]* [1.94]* 
Multiplant
 i  0.1188 -0.003 -0.0023 0.0021 
  [7.44]*** [0.17] [0.13] [0.12] 
lnLit-2    0.0989 0.093 0.0864 
   [15.99]*** [14.06]*** [12.92]*** 
US_MNE
 i    0.1047 0.1496 
    [2.30]** [3.32]*** 
Non_US_MNE
 i    0.074 0.1169 
    [2.40]** [3.75]*** 
UK_MNE
 i    0.0256 0.0706 
    [0.87] [2.35]** 
Exporter
 it-2     0.0967 
     [5.27]*** 
      
Observations 5926 5926 5926 5926 5926 
PR2 0.14 0.15 0.18 0.18 0.19 
Chi2 870.15 904.32 1026.88 1021.3 1050.92 
LL -3463.62 -3436 -3299.05 -3294.13 -3280.25 
Note: Robust Z test in brackets, equations include five digit industry dummies, dummy for imputed market shares, 
dummy for start-up, 12 regional dummies and a constant. 
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Table 5:  The effect of ownership and ∆O on productivity growth: OLS and IV 
(dependent variable ∆ln(Y/L)it), all variables as in Table 4, column 5 included, only those variables shown 
reported, all variables measured as deviation from three-digit mean) 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 OLS 2SLS i3SLS SURE OLS OLS OLS 
∆Oit -0.007 -0.0322 -0.0287 -0.0083  -0.0113 -0.0108 
 [1.39] [1.47] [1.32] [1.58]  [1.14] [1.09] 
∆Oit (I/Y)ITit  0.2009 0.1031 0.2235 0.1785  0.2094 0.2054 
 [2.89]** [0.17] [0.38] [1.47]  [1.74]* [1.71]* 
US_MNE
 i      0.0163 0.0188  
     [0.67] [0.76]  
US_MNE
 i (I/Y)ITit     0.563 0.5115  
     [1.66]* [1.49]  
∆Oit US_MNE i (I/Y)ITit       0.5882 
       [1.85]* 
Observations 5944 5221 5221 5221 5944 5944 5944 
R-squared 0.31    0.31 0.31 0.31 
Note:  Robust t-test in brackets, All variables measured as deviation from three-digit mean. Outliers removed.  
Tests and P values for IV equations in column 2 and 3 are: Hansen tests (Hansen/Sargan test of instrument validity 
from regression of residuals on assumed exogenous variables), 10.5 (p=0.23), Hausman test (test of whether the IV and 
OLS coefficients are significantly different), 2.17 (p=0.11), First step test (test for the significance of the instrument in 
a regression of the endogenous variable on the instrument and other exogenous variables), for ∆Oit  30.65 (p=0.00), for 
∆Oit•(I/Y)ITit 22.38 (p=0.00).  Column 4 is estimation by SURE, other columns are by OLS.  Column 1 repeats Table 
2, column 5. 
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Data Appendix: Further details on the CIS data and ∆O, IT and other variables. 
A1.  The CIS 
The CIS is a voluntary postal survey carried out by the Office of National Statistics on behalf of the 
Department of Trade and Industry, co-ordinated by Eurostat.  ONS randomly selects a stratified sample of 
firms with more than 10 employees drawn from the Interdepartmental business Register by SIC92 2-digit 
class and 8 employment size bands. The CIS is voluntary and postal.  To boost response, enterprises are sent 
the survey, posted a reminder, posted a second reminder (with the survey again) and finally telephoned. The 
response rate is 42% (about 8,000 questionnaires are returned), which is quite respectable against other 
voluntary surveys.  The survey is conducted at the “enterprise” level; where enterprise is defined as “the 
smallest combinations of legal units which have a certain degree of autonomy within an enterprise group”.  
Thus the survey potentially refers to more than one plant/establishment but it does refer to distinct lines of 
business.  For shorthand we shall refer to the unit of response as a “firm”.   
A2.  Data on ∆O  
We wish to gather data on disembodied organisation change.  The embodied/disembodied 
distinction seems suited to our data, since the CIS opening questionnaire paragraph says 
 
We begin by looking at innovation based on the results of new 
technological developments, new combinations of existing technology or 
utilisation of other knowledge held or acquired by your enterprise….The 
final part of the questionnaire broadens the focus to consider organisational 
and management changes. 
 
The actual question on organisational innovation, Question 17, refers to the latter part of this 
sentence and is as set out in the main body of this paper. The question on process innovation is  
  
5. Process Innovation. 
 
“For this survey process innovation is the use of new or 
significantly improved technology for production or the supply of goods and 
services.  Purely organisational or managerial changes should not be 
included.  For examples of process innovations see front cover” 
 
During the three year period 1998-2000, did your enterprise 
introduce any new or significantly improved processes for producing or 
supplying products (goods or services) which were new to your firm? 
 
The examples of process innovations on the front of the questionnaire are as follows: 
 
EXAMPLES OF PROCESS INNOVATIONS 
 
Linking of Computer Aided Design station to parts suppliers 
Introduction of Electronic Point of Sale equipment in Garden 
Centre 
Digitising of pre-press in printing house 
Robotised welding 
 
Firms are also given an example of what is not an innovation 
 
EXAMPLES WHICH ARE NOT TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 
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The renaming and repackaging of an existing soft drink popular 
with older people, to establish a link with a football team in order to reach 
the youth market, is not a technology based innovation as defined in this 
survey, but could register as a marketing change in question 17. New 
models of complex products, such as cars or television sets, are not product 
innovation, if the changes are minor compared with the previous models, for 
example offering a radio in a car. 
 
A number of points are worth making here.  First, the examples of team working or turnaround 
times of airliners seem to be non-technological and so according to the question, potentially captured by the 
“wider innovations” in Question 17 above.  A computerised booking system is more likely a technological 
process innovation as defined by the questionnaire; see the examples that are specified to firms, but in terms 
of the production function, likely embodied in capital.  Since firms are then asked about their expenditures 
on machinery related to innovations, then this expenditure likely captures expenditure on advanced capital, 
much of which is likely to be IT and we shall use this below.  Thus if they are captured in ∆KIT and ∆KNIT 
then this suggests they might not be included in ∆O.   
Second, it is quite possible that such process innovation, even if it is just expenditure on advanced 
machines, also involves disembodied organisational change as well which we would wish to capture.  In the 
regressions below we therefore use both measures and also them separately, but to probe this further at this 
stage we undertook two more detailed investigations. 
The first investigation to shed light on just what a process innovation is to look at what firms said 
they did by way of process innovation.  After being asked whether or not firms had a process innovation 
firms are asked  
 
5.4 Please give a short description of your most important process 
innovation: 
 
We used these answers to try to analyse what firms mean when answering yes to a process 
innovation: are they reporting on IT, other types of machines or organisational change.  What did we find? 
Around 1200 firms responded “yes” to having done any sort of process innovation but only 874 
provide some description of it.  To analyse what they say systematically we searched each description firms 
entered for any word we thought to be related to the hardware part of information technologies (IT) 
investment (key words used were: computer/s, automation, automatic digitalisation, Cnc, digital, 
automated, robotic, cad, networking, digitising, PC, computerisation, it, cam, network, robot, hardware, 
satellite, robotisation and automating.)  These key-words were generated after the analysis of a random 
sample of about 100 reported process innovations.  We then generated a new dummy variable called 
HARDWARE if any of these words was present. 
We then applied the same procedure to generate a dummy variable called SOFTWARE to detect the 
software component of information technologies, using the keywords: website, email, online, on-line, 
internet, web, software, virtual, programming, e-commerce, edi, cctv, programmes, application, intranet and 
email.24  Finally, we applied the procedure to generate a PROCESS ORGANISATION dummy, with 
keywords outsourced, coding, bar, lean, cell, sourcing, management, planning, outsourcing, laying out, iso, 
just, layout, cellular, logistics, kanbam, kanbams, stock and  re-organise.  Finally, for those cases with no 
match with any of the above mentioned key words, we created a category called “NON-IDENTIFIED”.  
Inspection of this category included typically complex descriptions of advanced capital machinery (for 
example: installation of steel wire armouring machinery, improved petal and leaf cutting, precision cooking 
and slicing equipment, introduction of spectrophotometer for more accurate shade matching). 
                                                   
24
 In this case some text cleaning was required because there were several cases with the phrase “computer software”, 
which was cleaned to just “software”. 
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Appendix Table 1 shows the results of this analysis.25 The largest category is still the non-identified 
case with 53% of the cases.  Looking at the other categories, about 22% are hardware related process 
innovations, 15% are software related process innovations and less than 9% correspond to process 
organisation. Thus it would seem reasonable to assume that whilst many reported process innovations are 
machinery related, especially to IT, at least some of the reported process innovations are possibly 
disembodied since they refer to new sorts of the organisation of production, perhaps linked to the 
introduction of new machines. 
Appendix Table 1: Analysis process innovation using firm-reported text 
Type of Word Number Share 
  (%) 
HARDWARE word 197 22.54 
SOFTWARE word 134 15.33 
LEAN PROCESS word 78 8.92 
NON-IDENTIFIED 465 53.20 
Total 874 100 
Source: Authors’ calculations using CIS3 
 
Our second investigation is to look at the correlations between reported process innovations, IT 
spending26 and reported organisational innovations. Appendix Table 2 sets out all the possible combinations 
of IT, organisational change and process innovation.  Thus this does not confine us to just those firms who 
answered yes to process innovation and then filled out the most significant innovation.   
 
Appendix Table 2: IT investment, Process Innovations and Organisational Change 
Type of Innovation Number Share 
  (%) 
No IT, no OCH, NO Proc 2,136 36 
Yes IT, no OCH, no Proc 340 6 
No IT, Yes OCH, no PROC 1,540 26 
No IT, No OCH, Yes Proc 116 2 
Yes IT, Yes OCH, No Proc 729 12 
Yes IT, No OCH, Yes Proc 133 2 
No IT, Yes OCH, Yes Proc 283 5 
Yes IT, Yes OCH, Yes Proc 667 11 
Total 5,944 100 
Source: Authors’ calculations using CIS3. Numbers may not add due to rounding. 
 
As the table shows, the largest group (36%) are those who did none of all three questions.  The 
second largest are those doing just organisational change (OCH) (26%), but not either of the two other 
changes.  The third largest (12%) are those investing in IT and OCH but claiming to have no process 
innovations, whilst 11% of firms are making changes in all three dimensions.  All the other categories are 
below 6% of firms.  
What then is the interpretation of these numbers?  First, the largest group, those who did only 
organisational change with no process or IT investment (25.9% of firms), is consistent with the idea that 
reported organisational change is potentially disembodied from IT capital.  Second, 7.71% of firms report 
                                                   
25
 Because there was some degree of overlapping among the different classes, some results were re-allocated in order to 
have classes that are fully exclusive. If there was an overlap between HARDWARE and SOFTWARE the observation 
was allocated only to SOFTWARE, because it is the class with fewer cases. Following in the same way, if there is an 
overlap between SOFTWARE and LEAN the observation was allocated only to the last one, and so on. Hence, in the 
results of below the categories will be fully exclusive. 
26
 We set out how we measure IT below. 
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doing process innovation but no spending on IT (1.95 with no organisational change, 5.76 with) suggesting 
that, as above, at least part of process innovation might not necessarily be embodied in IT capital.27  Third, 
12.26% of firms undertook IT and OC but reported no process innovations.  These might be firms whose IT 
is not related to the technical production process but needs OC e.g. payroll, accounting or customer records 
e.g. IT.  Fourth, can we enter organisational change and process innovation as separate measures of ∆O?  
Since we will enter IT as well identification of these measures separately would rely on sufficient firms 
undertaking them in isolation.28  The problem is that, as Appendix Table 2 shows, only 1.95%of firms 
undertook only process innovation with no organisational change or IT investment.  Thus we are not 
confident that we can enter organisational change and process innovation as separate measures of ∆O and 
identify them reliably (this indeed turned out to be the case, both terms and their interactions were ill 
determined because of multi-collinearity).  Therefore we combined them together as part of ∆O.  29 
  
A3 Data on IT 
To cross-check the data on IT we did the following.  First, as documented in the answers to the 
questions above, many firms responded to the process innovation description questionnaire with IT related 
descriptions and many with specialised capital machinery.  Thus we believe that answers to this question are 
likely at least to relate to advanced capital machinery and frequently to IT investment. 
Second, to check this further, we undertook a similar text analysis this time for all firms who 
reported a process innovation and also reported spending on machinery (620 firms, as opposed to the 874 
reporting a process innovation in Appendix Table 1.  The patterns of analysis were very similar to Appendix 
Table 1 with the fractions reporting hardware, software, process organisation and non-identified being 24%, 
14%, 7% and 55% respectively. 
Third, we cross-checked our data against two industry-level IT estimates  The first is available at 
roughly two digit level and comes from the VICS project at the ONS which calculates the volume of capital 
services for two digit industries from 1970 to the present.  It does this by calculating capital stocks for 
buildings, vehicles, IT machinery and non-IT machinery using perpetual inventory methods and weighting 
these together by the user cost of capital for each stock.  We obtained the investment data for each series and 
expressed nominal IT investment as a proportion of total investment, where total investment was the total 
nominal investment in all categories, not weighted by the user cost (this is therefore the closest to what we 
do). 
Appendix Table 3 sets out the results.  The top row shows, by two digit industry, the number of 
observations, the average ratio of nominal IT investment to total nominal investment, the standard deviation, 
the minimum and maximum for our measure.  The second row shows the data from the VICS database.  As 
the table shows, the mean value and standard deviation are very close, although the minimum and maximum 
are rather larger in our data.  The final two columns show the Pearson and rank correlations, which are 
statistically significant.30 Thus we conclude our measure correlates quite well. 
For our second comparison, we compiled three-digit industry averages from our data and compared 
them with those derived from the firm-level dataset used in Bloom et al. (2006).  The lower panel of 
Appendix Table 3 shows the results.  Here the average value is higher than in the first panel but the averages 
look similar.31  The final two columns report significant correlation coefficients.   
Fourth, we have a smaller sample of data where we can match the CIS to ABI data on outputs and 
inputs, including total capital stock data.32  Using the CIS data on IT investment and non-IT investment, we 
                                                   
27
 This calculation is done by setting any missing values for IT equal to zero.  There were under 10% of these and 
deleting these altogether made little difference. 
28
 This is not strictly correct since we use IT as a continuous variable as set out below.  But it gives the essential 
intuition behind why in practice we cannot identify all these effects separately. 
29
 When we entered these variables together they were too collinear to be precisely estimated. 
30
 These numbers are after deleting 3 outlier industries that rendered the correlation statistically insignificant. 
31
 It is not clear why the averages higher than in the upper panel, but could be to do with the weighting on the industry 
panel (the lower panel is unweighted) and different use of micro data in the industry data. 
32
 The ABI collects detailed data on outputs and inputs but on investment inputs not capital stock, see Criscuolo, Haskel 
and Martin (2003).  We build up capital stocks using investment data and an assumed starting value using the perpetual 
inventory method, see Martin (2004). 
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built an IT and non-IT capital stock for this sample, 1997 to 2000 giving us 2,804 firm-year observations.  
We then ran a regression of the log level of value added on the levels of employment, non-IT capital and IT 
capital (with additional controls for three digit industry dummies, regional dummies, year dummies and 
company status change dummies).  We compared these coefficients with those reported by BBH, Table 6 
column 1, who have 3,331 firm-year observations; the coefficient on IT capital was 0.030 (t=3.07) whereas 
BBH obtained 0.033 (t=1.99).  Thus this robustness check produces very close results to them and this is 
especially interesting given that their IT measure is based on a survey of hardware computing power. 
Fifth, Bloom et al (2005) report a share of IT in gross output of 0.012 (see their table 1).  When we 
undertake the above regression on gross output rather than value added, the coefficient on the log level of IT 
capital is 0.0055.  The implied marginal return to IT capital is 0.0055/0.012=46%.  Below we shall find a 
marginal return of 30%, which seems not too far from this estimate, given our estimate comes from an 
equation in first differences, which would bias down the estimated marginal return in the presence of 
measurement error. 
Sixth, BBH suggest that IT, organisational change, upskilling and product innovation are all inter-
linked.  The correlation between all these variables (controlling for industry) was significant and positive in 
all cases. 
Overall then, these seven robustness checks suggest to us that our data is correlated with advanced 
capital equipment and IT and thus, we believe, can be regarded as a (perhaps noisy) estimate of IT 
investment. 
 
Appendix Table 3.: CIS vs. ONS IT Data, summary statistics and correlations 
Survey Agg Level Obs Mean Sd Min Max Pearson Rank 
CIS 3 Sic-Frame 18 0.107 0.081 0.010 0.335   
ONSa Sic-Frame 18 0.126 0.084 0.001 0.280 0.546* 0.494** 
CIS 3 Sic-3 Digit 43 0.127 0.104 0.011 0.456   
ONSb Sic-3 Digit 43 0.149 0.093 0.034 0.504 0.546* 0.474** 
Source: ONSa data comes from the Volumne Index of Capital Services (VICS) Database and ONSb data comes 
from Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2006) 
 
Finally, we are now in a position to reprise the question of what, on these data, constitutes a process 
innovation.  Our maintained hypothesis, from the analysis of the text, is that it is a combination of advanced 
capital investment and process organisational change (e.g. lean manufacturing). IN fact the data shows that 
whilst 20% of firms report a process innovation 75% of firms report positive investment, so that process 
innovation is not just investment.  31% of firms report investment in IT, closer to the process innovation 
proportion, but still above it, confirming that IT investment can be more than just related to new 
manufacturing production processes.  Thus we think these are data consistent with the view that measured 
process innovation is investment into advanced capital stocks and accompanying organisational change. 
 
A4. Construction of ∆(I IT/Y) and ∆(I non-IT/Y) 
We have data for I in 1998 and 2000 and data for IIT in 2000.  We construct (IIT/I) for 2000 and 
apply this to I in 1998 to get IIT for 1998.  We then interpolate these data for 1999.  Accumulating those 
gives (IIT /Y) for use in the regression, where Y is measured as output in 1998. 
 
A5. Construction of ∆k IT and ∆k non-IT 
In the regressions above we use I/Y in productivity growth regressions.  The alternative is to use I 
and an assumed depreciation rate and starting value of K to calculate K with the perpetual inventory method.  
We set out a comparison of the two methods here.  
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Our CIS data is on investment and we can use it as follows.  Using the relation ∆K=I-δKt-1 we may 
write K00=I00 + (1-δ)I99 + (1-δ)2K98 where the superscript denotes the year.  Since we have changes in Y 
between 1998 and 2000, we wish to measures changes in capital, ∆k (ignore the IT and non-IT distinction 
for the moment).  Using this equation, (K00  - K98 )= I00 + (1-δ)I99 - δ(2-δ)K98
.  
There are
 
then two ways to 
proceed.  First, from the linearised production function, the output elasticity α=(∂Y/∂K)(K/Y). Hence we 
can write α∆lnK=γ (∆K/Y) where γ=(∆Y/K) which is the return on capital.  Thus from the above, (∆K/Y)= 
(I00 + (1-δ)I99)/Y- δ(2-δ)(K98/Y).  The first term of this is data and so can be included in the regression.  The 
last term is missing, since we have no initial capital stock value, K98 and so is omitted.  Thus the bias to the 
estimated return depends on both δ and (in a single regressor model at least) the ratio of the covariance 
between (I00 + (1-δ)I99) and (K98/Y). 
An alternative method is to assume a value for K98, the initial capital stock, and then use it to 
calculate ∆lnK in (7) directly.  We can write ∆lnK=( K00  - K98 )/ K98 = (I00 + (1-δ)I99)/K98 - δ(2-δ).  With an 
assumed value for K98 the first term on the right hand side is data, and the second term can be relegated to 
the equation error.  The problem is that we do not have an initial value and our data set is too short for errors 
in an initial value to depreciate away.  Hence we are forced with this approach to assume a missing value, in 
which case the omitted term consigned to the error is a function of the gap between the assumed and true 
value of K98 and (I00 + (1-δ)I99) (since K98 is in the denominator of the ∆lnK expression).  We were 
concerned that the assumption of a starting value could be hazardous, particularly since we do not even have 
total capital stock levels for all firms from the ABI data. 
Since our concern is mostly with obtaining an expression for α∆lnK, we shall stick to using the 
investment ratios.  However, we did wish also to compare our coefficients on inputs to those of Bresnahan 
who runs a level regression of lnY on logs of inputs (as well as levels of organisational capital).  Thus to do 
this we needed to start with a measure for K98.  We did this by going to the ARD data and using the data 
there on the total capital stock of the firm.  This is in turn calculated from a perpetual inventory method 
using ABI data on total investment (we have no data on IT investment in the production Census), which 
itself needs starting values for total capital stock, which we impute using two digit real ONS capital stock 
data multiplied by the share of materials spending in the firm as a proportion of total industry materials 
spending (we also impute investment data for years in which the firm is missing from the ARD sample).  We 
then multiply this real capital stock for the firm by the fraction of all capital in the industry accounted for by 
IT according to the VICS data set to give us a real IT capital stock, the rest being non-IT capital stock.  The 
biases in this method are therefore due to the possible inaccuracy of the starting IT capital stock value.   
Appendix Table 4:  Descriptive Statistics of main variables. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Yit  5944 31480 251068 7 11200000 
Lit  5944 195 891 1 42900 
Mit 5944 16967 124228 1 6634977 
∆ln(Y/L)it  5944 0.062 0.375 -4.779 3.320 
∆lnLit 5944 0.059 0.345 -3.769 2.803 
∆lnMit 5944 0.052 0.643 -6.413 6.971 
 (I/Y)NITit  5944 0.097 0.150 0.000 0.953 
 (I/Y)ITit  5944 0.021 0.069 0.000 0.862 
∆MSHAREit-2 5926 0.008 0.241 -6.62 8.548 
Note: Yit is the total turnover in 2000 (market sales of goods and services including exports and taxes except VAT) 
in £000. Lit is the number of employees (full time equivalents) in 2000. Mit is the total purchases of material and 
intermediate inputs in £000 (variable derived from the administrative records). ∆ln(Y/L)it labour productivity growth 
between 1998 and 2000. ∆lnLit is employment growth between 1998 and 2000. ∆lnMit is raw materials growth between 
1998 and 2000. (I/Y)NITit is the IT investment rate over the period 1998-2000 normalized by turnover in 1998. Finally 
(I/Y)NITit is the Non-IT investment over the period 1998-2000 normalized by turnover in 1998. All the monetary figures 
are in current prices.  ∆MSHAREit-2 is the variation of firm market share between 1997 and 1996 from administrative 
data 
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